


Preliminaries

- We assume that individuals are *instrumentally rational*.
- Preferences: individual wants
- Self-interested
- External environment/beliefs
-


- Comparability (Completeness) Alternatives are said to be comparable in terms of preferences if, for any two possible alternatives, x and y , either xPy , yPx , or xly
- Transitivity. The strict preference relation is said to be transitive if, for any three possible alternatives - x , y , and z - if xPy and yPz , then xPz . Similarly, if xly and ylz , then xlz .
-

- If an individual satisfies completeness and transitivity, he is said to have preference ordering. His preferences can be represented by a utility function, $u()$.
- If xPy , then $u(x) > u(y)$.
- This is only ordinal and can be rescaled by affine transformations.


- How to model preferences in politics?
- The spatial model




a. First locations





b. Second locations




c. Third locations










Utility




Ideal point









	Vote			% right
	ϕ_1 vs. M_1	ϕ_2 vs. M_2	ϕ_3 vs. M_3	
Group position	ϕ_1	ϕ_2	M_3	
Kennedy	Wrong	Right	Right	67
Hatfield	Wrong	Right	Wrong	33
Helms	Wrong	Wrong	Wrong	0

Butter

A




B




C




Guns






Butter



Guns



Butter

• A

B


ϕ


$W(B)$


• C





x


Guns











- Constitutional Framework
 - SMD vs PR/multi-member
 - Districting Gerrymandering
- Election Laws
- Political Parties
- Social and Political Context