Auctioning off the Agenda:
Bargaining in Legislatures with Endogenous Scheduling
(with Jernej Copic)
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1266. There are
many examples of allocation problems where the final
allocation affects more than one agent, but the models
developed to study them typically allow for side
payments between agent. However, there are political
economy applications where it is hard to imagine
monetary transfers between the agents, at least not
legal ones. In this paper we propose a general
political economic framework for the study of
allocation problems with externalities without side
payments. We consider a setup with complete information
and we formulate the problem as one where the status
quo describes an initial allocation that can altered in
a sequence of proposals. The number of these proposals
is restricted. In the context of our main application,
bidding for slots on a legislative agenda, such
restriction can be interpreted as scarcity of plenary
time for considering the possible bills to move the
policy. The intuition for our model comes out of
framing the problem as a special type of a multi-good
auction. We show that equilibria generically exist
within the general model.
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1267R. Since the
passage of he “Help America Vote Act” in 2002, nearly
half of the states have adopted a variety of new
identification requirements for voter registration and
participation by the 2006 general election. There has
been little analysis of whether these requirements
reduce voter participation, espe- cially among certain
classes of voters. In this paper we document the effect
of voter identification requirements on registered
voters as they were imposed in states in the 2000 and
2004 presidential elections, and in the 2002 and 2006
midterm elections. Looking first at trends in the
aggregate data, we find no evidence that voter
identification requirements reduce participation. Using
individual-level data from the Current Population
Survey across these elections, however, we find that
the strictest forms of voter identification re-
quirements — combination requirements of presenting an
identification card and positively matching one’s
signature with a signature either on file or on the
identification card, as well as requirements to show
picture identification — have a negative impact on the
participation of registered voters relative to the
weakest requirement, stating one’s name. We also find
find evidence that the stricter voter identification
requirements depress turnout to a greater ex- tent for
less educated and lower income populations, but no
racial differences.
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1293. Ordinal
variables — categorical variables with a defined order
to the cat- egories, but without equal spacing between
them — are frequently used in social science
applications. Although a good deal of research exists
on the proper modeling of ordinal response variables,
there is not a clear directive as to how to model
ordinal treatment variables. The usual approaches found
in the literature for using ordinal treatment variables
are either to use fully unconstrained, though additive,
ordinal group indicators or to use a numeric predictor
constrained to be continuous. Generalized additive
models are a useful exception to these assumptions
(Beck and Jackman 1998). In con- trast to the
generalized additive modeling approach, we propose the
use of a Bayesian shrinkage estimator to model ordinal
treatment variables. The es- timator we discuss in this
paper allows the model to contain both individual group
level indicators and a continuous predictor. In
contrast to traditionally used shrinkage models that
pull the data toward a common mean, we use a linear
model as the basis. Thus, each individual effect can be
arbitrary, but the model “shrinks” the estimates toward
a linear ordinal framework ac- cording to the data. We
demonstrate the estimator on two political science
examples: the impact of voter identification
requirements on turnout (Al- varez, Bailey, and Katz
2007), and the impact of the frequency of religious
service attendance on the liberality of abortion
attitudes (e.g., Singh and Leahy 1978, Tedrow and
Mahoney 1979, Combs and Welch 1982).
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1294R.
Misreporting is a problem that plagues researchers that
use survey data. In this paper, we develop a parametric
model that corrects for misclassified binary responses
using information on the misreporting patterns obtained
from auxiliary data sources. The model is implemented
within the Bayesian framework via Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods, and can be easily extended to
address other problems exhibited by survey data, such
as missing response and/or covariate values. While the
model is fully general, we illustrate its application
in the context of estimating models of turnout using
data from the American National Elections Studies.
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1304. This paper
deals with a variety of dynamic issues in the analysis
of time-series--cross-section (TSCS) data. While the
issues raised are more general, we focus on
applications to political economy. We begin with a
discussion of specification and lay out the theoretical
differences implied by the various types of time series
models that can be estimated. It is shown that there is
nothing pernicious in using a lagged dependent variable
and that all dynamic models either implicitly or
explicitly have such a variable; the differences
between the models relate to assumptions about the
speeds of adjustment of measured and unmeasured
variables. When adjustment is quick it is hard to
differentiate between the various models; with slower
speeds of adjustment the various models make
sufficiently different predictions that they can be
tested against each other. As the speed of adjustment
gets slower and slower, specification (and estimation)
gets more and more tricky. We then turn to a discussion
of estimation. It is noted that models with both a
lagged dependent variable and serially correlated
errors can easily be estimated; it is only OLS that is
inconsistent in this situation. We then show, via Monte
Carlo analysis shows that for typical TSCS data that
fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable performs
about as well as the much more complicated Kiviet
estimator, and better than the Anderson-Hsiao estimator
(both designed for panels).